Posts Tagged cognitive science

Are Men Naturally Predisposed to Excel in Life?

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A 1999 episode of In Our Time was ostensibly about “feminism,” but in fact addressed a narrower and more pressing issue: Are men “by nature more competitive, ambitious, status-conscious, dedicated, single-minded and persevering than women”? And if so, doesn’t that mean men are biologically better disposed than women to achieve material success? And if that’s true, doesn’t it follow that the comparatively disadvantaged status women hold in modern society results from “natural” psychological differences, rather than “cultural” patriarchy? What would that then mean for feminism’s mission? Should society ensure equal opportunity, or privilege difference? I would have thought such claims would arouse more backlash than it has. But such theories are taken seriously, to some degree, because they are championed by Prof. Helena Cronin, an academic philosopher at the London School of Economics Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. Lest you think I’ve mischaracterized Cronin’s arguments, you can also read them here:
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Magnetic Morality Modulation

This September, PBS will re-broadcast an interesting episode of NOVA ScienceNOW, which touches on some points raised in PEL’s interview with Patricia Churchland. The episode demonstrates a procedure called Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), which can influence a person’s moral judgments as they are being made, simply by messing with the neural activity located within the brain’s Right TemporoParietal Junction (RTPJ):

If you find the clip interesting, you can find the published research here.

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Churchland Ep. Name Drop #2: Chris Eliasmith

people on a brainAround 55 min into the episode, Pat described one of the possible roles of a philosopher re. the sciences is “the analogue of doing theoretical physics,” and she mentioned Chris Eliasmith as a paradigm example of this. He’s the Director for the Centre for Theoretical Neuroscience at the University of Waterloo.

I quote from their web site:

Theoretical neuroscience is the quantitative study of neurobiological systems using the tools of information theory, signal processing, control theory, machine learning, and dynamic systems theory. It is concerned with issues of neural representation, neural architecture, learning, nonlinear systems, and complexity as they relate to understanding the uniquely flexible and effective behaviours of humans and animals.

Eliasmith is the laboratory head for the Computational Neuroscience Research Group, which is:

…dedicated to developing and using a unified mathematical framework for modeling large-scale neurobiological systems. We are currently applying this framework to specific projects in sensory processing, motor control, and cognitive function. Our on-going work encompasses purely theoretical issues, specific biologically realistic models (e.g., of Parkinson’s Disease, hemineglect, human linguistic inference, rodent navigation, among others), and practical applications (e.g., automatic text classification, clustering, and data mining). These modeling efforts are carried out in collaboration with various experimental groups who use techniques that span the range from single cell physiology to fMRI.

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Be Reasonable, Do It My Way

MercierAll reasoning is in service of winning arguments? I knew it all along! It’s hard for me to express any skepticism of the study cited in this New York Times article without going all meta, so I’ll just let the article speak for itself:

Now some researchers are suggesting that reason evolved for a completely different purpose: to win arguments. Rationality. . . is nothing more or less than a servant of the hard-wired compulsion to triumph in the debating arena. According to this view, bias, lack of logic and other supposed flaws that pollute the stream of reason are instead social adaptations that enable one group to persuade (and defeat) another. Certitude works, however sharply it may depart from the truth.

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Science Proves Heidegger (Partially) Correct?

Schematic Heidegger

Irony so overwhelming I want to tweet about it with a #Heidegger hashtag:

scientific study recently found empirical support for Heidegger’s concept of zuhanden, which was discussed in the Being and Time podcast.* Wired Science covered the story last year, but the study itself is short enough that you can get through it during a lunch break. To quote the summary section of the paper:

Heidegger’s phenomenology has been influential in the cognitive sciences, despite the fact that no attempts have been made to empirically confirm his insights. The experiments in this paper support Heidegger’s description of the transition from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand, a phenomenon that is key for his overall phenomenological philosophy. When humans are smoothly coping with entities ready-to-hand, they see through their tools to focus on the task they are using those tools to complete. When that coping is disrupted by a temporary malfunction, humans can no longer see through the malfunctioning tool and experience it as unready-to-hand. We demonstrated this transition by showing that when participants smoothly operate a mouse in a video game task, the body-tool performance displays the complex dynamics typical of an IDS [interaction-dominant dynamics]. Temporarily disrupting mouse behavior temporarily disrupted this IDS, at least at the body-tool boundary. We also showed that this disruption led to a reconfiguration of the participants’ awareness of the situation by showing a shift in resources allocated to an additional cognitive task. This is closing in on Heidegger’s transition from readiness-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand. We take these experiments as progress toward justifying the influence that Heidegger’s phenomenological philosophy has had on cognitive sciences and justifying the partly Heidegger-inspired claim that cognitive systems sometimes extend beyond the biological body.

Take that, positivists! I’m not capable of assessing the quality of the study, but it looks impressive enough. More interestingly, some smartipantzen undergrads over at CalTech cited the study as inspiration for their class project on web browser optimization. One of them now works at Google. So, the ideas of a notoriously anti-technological fascist philosopher may now be influencing new ways to improve web browsers. This may be the only justice history can offer!

*Note that Hubert Dreyfus has also applied Heideggerian concepts to analysis of high technology, but Dreyfus never attempted any empirical research of which I’m aware.

-Daniel Horne

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Later Pragmatists: Robert Brandom on language

OK, at this point I’m just going on youtube searches for “pragmatism;” I was not previously familiar with Brandom, though he is apparently well known and studied under Rorty and Princeton and has a beard that looks stunning when backlit.

He has some interesting comments here about the historical point at which pragmatism as we read about it arose and about “analytic pragmatism,” i.e. using analytic philosophy tools for treating language in pursuing the pragmatist project. Some of this is a little technical, but you can probably see what he’s trying to synthesize in broad strokes. And did you know that Wittgenstein was really an avatar, and not really a blue-skinned alien? Brandom says so!

Here’s part II, where he goes into the relation between philosophy of language and cognitive science, which will give you a clue about how weird philosophy of language is, which will be confirmed when we do our Frege and Heidegger episodes (eventually). Read the rest of this entry »

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Episode 21: What Is the Mind? (Turing, et al)

Discussing articles by Alan Turing, Gilbert Ryle, Thomas Nagel, John Searle, and Dan Dennett.

What is this mind stuff, and how can it “be” the brain? Can computers think? No? What if they’re really sexified? Then can they think? Can the mind be a computer? Can it be a room with a guy in it that doesn’t speak Chinese? Can science completely understand it? …The mind, that is, not the room, or Chinese. What is it like to be a bat? What about a weevil? Do you even know what a weevil is, really? Then how do you know it’s not a mind? Hmmmm? Is guest podcaster Marco Wise a robot? Even his wife cannot be sure!

We introduce the mind/body problem and the wackiness that it engenders by breezing through several articles, which you may read along with us:

1. Alan Turing’s 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.

2. A chapter of Gilbert Ryle’s 1949 book The Concept of Mind called “Descartes’ Myth.

3. Thomas Nagel’s 1974 essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?

4. John Searle’s Chinese Room argument, discussed in a 1980 piece, “Minds, Brains and Programs.”

5. Daniel C. Dennett’s “Quining Qualia.”

Some additional resources that we talk about: David Chalmers’s “Consciousness and its Place in Nature, “ Frank Jackson’s “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Paul Churchland’s Matter and Consciousness,Jerry Fodor’s “The Mind-Body Problem,” Zoltan Torey’s The Crucible of Consciousness,and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s long entry on the Chinese Room argument.

End Song: “No Mind” from 1998’s Mark Lint and the Fake Johnson Trio; the whole album is now free online.

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