Posts Tagged David Hume
David Hume and Adam Smith in the Context of Eighteenth-Century Moral Philosophy, Part 2
Posted by Getty Lustila in PEL's Notes on November 15, 2011

The University of Edinburgh from World University
As mentioned in my previous entry, moral philosophy in the eighteenth century was principally concerned with three issues: “the selfish hypothesis,” the nature of moral judgment, and the character of moral virtue. This entry regards the second component: the debate between the rationalists and sentimentalists over the nature and justification of moral judgment.
Moral rationalism—exemplified most clearly in modern philosophy with the work of Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, and John Balguy—affirms two theses: first, that morality exists; and second, that all particular truths about morality are ascertained through a priori reasoning. Moral judgments are then, properly speaking, judgments performed by an agent’s “faculty of reason.” What is it that the agent is reasoning about? She is reasoning about conceptual relations; or, in Hume’s terms, the “relations of ideas.” (An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding IV.I) Ideas, or concepts, are either “fit” or “unfit” for each other. For example, the idea of “human being” fits with the idea of “perfecting oneself,” but it does not fit with the idea of “pursuing one’s happiness above all others.”
Amartya Sen on Hume on Ethics
Posted by Daniel Horne in Things to Watch on November 12, 2011
This video records Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s somewhat rambling lecture, wherein he discusses a few themes in Hume’s ethical work which he deems relevant today. Specifically, Sen wants to advocate for Hume’s argument that society’s globalization tends to expand its moral sensitivities. We hear that Hume was among the first to argue that a society’s mores were a function of its culture rather than physical circumstances. Hume was also an early critic of then-nascent British imperialism, arguing that it demeaned the conquerers as much as the conquered.
Many of the Humean insights to which Sen refers seem so obviously true today as to be unworthy of further discussion. But perhaps that says as much of Hume’s foresight and intellectual victory as the tepid nature of Sen’s summary. To be honest, I couldn’t tease out any great insights from the lecture, but I’ll let Sen’s intellectual cred justify the post, and anyway it may prove interesting to those trying to assess Hume’s contributions, if not his continued relevance.
-Daniel Horne
David Hume and Adam Smith in the Context of Eighteenth-Century Moral Philosophy, Part 1
Posted by Getty Lustila in PEL's Notes on November 6, 2011
Moral philosophy in the eighteenth century was principally concerned with three issues. First, was “the selfish hypothesis,” which maintained that all declarations of public interest were ultimately expressions of private interest. Second, was the explanation and justification of moral judgment. And third, was the character of moral virtue.
The selfish hypothesis, though largely a minority view, was defended equally by proponents of Mechanism (Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville) and Jansenism (Pierre Nicole). The mechanists considered man to be a machine, one whose parts functioned “every bit as naturally as the movements of a clock or other automaton follows from the arrangement of its counter-weights and wheels.” (Descartes, Treatise of Man, 108) The Jansenists took man to be inherently depraved; marked by original sin and destined, save the grace of God, for an eternity of hellfire. Despite fundamental disagreements between the Mechanists and Jansenists though, both groups congregated on a common view of human nature: one where man consists solely of an amalgam of passions that provoke and govern him without his control. The most forceful of these passions is self-love, which serves as the chief motivation for all human action. (Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: And Other Writings
, 36) Man’s principal commitment to his own self-love undercuts genuine other-regarding action and stymies the opportunity for moral virtue.
Hume on Miracles Revisited
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in PEL's Notes on September 21, 2011
Chapter 1 of the Mackie book covers Hume’s account of miracles, which we discussed in our Hume epistemology episode. One of our blog commenters here mentioned offhand that he thought that argument had been long discredited, which was a surprise to me.
You can review the argument at Wikipedia here. Basically it boils down to “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” We have plenty of experience of people lying, but (and this is an appeal to your own experience) no experience of the laws of nature being evidently contravened for special happenstances. Though miracles may in fact occur, we’re never epistemically justified in believing them. Though Hume nominally leaves room for revelation being a route to bypass normal epistemic procedures, Mackie for one just thinks Hume was doing lip service to this principle to minimize his political trouble.
Mackie thinks that arguing for miracles is especially tricky because you have to both argue that there are laws of nature, and that these can be contravened divinely. It’s not enough that there might be some experienced regularities, but that we’re ignorant of the mechanism behind these and so could run into apparent exceptions to the rules we’ve established. It’s that, yes, these are laws working deterministically within a closed system, yet God can set them aside at will. From p. 26:
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Happy Birthday David Hume!
Posted by Seth Paskin in Misc. Philosophical Musings, Other (i.e. Lesser) Podcasts on May 5, 2011
This month lots of people are celebrating David Hume‘s 300th birthday, including our friends at The Philosopher’s Zone and Philosophy Bites. Both have dedicated a series of podcasts to this most important thinker in our tradition and if you aren’t a Humeophile or don’t know that much about him, I’d definitely recommend checking out their special episodes. Did you know that Hume:
- Finished A Treatise of Human Nature when he was only 26? And was supported by his siblings while he wrote it?
- Might have modeled this magnum opus on Hobbes’ work of the same name?
- Was the talk of European intellectual circles for this work but was disappointed at its reception?
- Struggled with his weight?
- Ultimately gave up philosophy to write history? And that his History of England was immensely popular and made him rich?
- Tried to help Rousseau and was treated dreadfully by that prick?
- Never explicitly confessed either atheism or belief in religion claiming no proof existed for either side?
We most all are familiar with his argument against the ability to experience causation and his explication of inductive reasoning, but like many great figures in the tradition, was also a character, admired and reviled and a polymath. Do yourself a favor and pay homage this month to Davie by checking out his works, listening the podcasts referenced above, visiting the Hume Society’s page or watching this clever little video.
Episode 17: Hume’s Empiricism: What Can We Know?
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on March 29, 2010
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 2:05:25 — 114.9MB)
Reading David Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
David Hume thinks that all we can know are our own impressions, i.e. what our moment-to-moment experiences tell us. Funny thing, though: he thinks that no experience shows us one event causing another event. We only experience one thing happening, then another, and these sequences tend to display a lot of uniformity. So, if we have any legitimate idea of causality at all, it must just be that: regular patterns of conjoined events.
We discuss what Hume thinks this view implies for the free will question, belief in miracles, whether external objects are actually there, Seth’s experience of Towlie, and more.
Read with us: http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/9662.
End song: “Twitch” by by The MayTricks, from the 1994 album Happy Songs Will Bring You Down.






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