Posts Tagged epistemology
Diet Soap (C. Dereck Varn and Doug Lain) on Epistemology
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Other (i.e. Lesser) Podcasts on January 16, 2012
I’ve been talking to Dereck (aka Skepoet) about coming on as a guest with us (on Saussure), and I noticed this new episode of Diet Soap features he and Doug Lain in a wide-ranging conversation on skepticism and its relation to phenomenology. One interesting point to add to the PEL deliberations on the growth of the self is from the post-structuralists (I guess) on consciousness itself being “built like a language.” I’m not clear from the discussion what this means yet but look forward to figuring it out.
-Mark Linsenmayer
Episode 48: Merleau-Ponty on Perception and Knowledge
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on December 17, 2011
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:41:47 — 93.3MB)
Discussing Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s “Primacy of Perception” (1946) and The World of Perception (1948).
What is the relation of perception to knowledge? In M-P’s phenomenology, perception is primary: even our knowledge of mathematical truths is in some way conditioned by and dependent on the fact that we are creatures with bodies and senses that work the way they do. Science is great, but it doesn’t discover the truth of things hiding behind perception: it is an abstraction from certain kinds of perceptions. Other modes of approaching things, e.g. art, can equally well give us knowledge, though of a different kind.
Mark, Seth, Wes, and Dylan argue over whether this thesis is just a bunch of truisms and despair over not having read The Phenomenology of Perception, the longer work which what we did read was meant to summarize. Is M-P just saying that scientific knowledge is defeasible, which scientists already believe? Read more about this topic.
Buy “The Primacy of Perception and its Philosophical Consequences,”or read it online. Buy World of Perception,
or read online.
End song: “Write Me Off” by Mark Lint and the Simulacra. Read about it.
If you enjoy this episode, please donate at least $1:
Daniel Coffeen on Bergson’s Matter and Memory
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Other (i.e. Lesser) Podcasts, Web Detritus on December 6, 2011
One of the name-drops on the Sartre episode is Henri Bergson, a philosopher who was in vogue in France at the time Sartre wrote, famous among other things for promoting and anti-atomic epistemology. Kant, for instance, thought that we get our idea of number out of time, meaning that time is essentially something we can count. For Bergson, time is a flow: if we break it up for analysis, that’s an abstraction; it’s epistemically subsequent to the primal flow. This goes well with Sartre’s (and moreso Mereleau-Ponty’s) excitement about gestalt psychology as part of the phenomenologist’s project of taking experience as it comes without falsifying it with some theory, like Hume’s empiricism, imposed upon the data.
With a little research I found this podcast/lecture on Bergson by Daniel Coffeen, focusing on Bergson’s book Matter and Memory.
Quassim Cassam (via Elucidations) on Skepticism
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Other (i.e. Lesser) Podcasts on December 5, 2011
I’ve been listening of late to more Elucidations (which we’ve written about before), which features Matt Teichman from our Frege episode.
Their episode 23, “Quassim Cassam discusses transcendental arguments,” serves as a nice point of re-engagement with epistemology in light of our touching on that in our Sartre episode (and moreso in my Close Reading).
Sartre, following Heidegger and possibly Husserl, thinks that Descartes’s skeptical challenge is a non-starter. We can’t coherently doubt the existence of the external world because we’re already always engaged with it: consciousness (or in Heidegger’s case “care,” though I recall at least one listener objecting to my analogizing between the two terms) has is intentional: the “external” world is something we’re directly in contact with (at least an aspect of it; the entirety of even an individual object is transcendent).
In this very clear and well-conducted Elucidations interview, Cassam talks a bit about an analytic version of this response, which is one given by G.E. Moore in (among other places) his essay “A Defense of Common Sense.” In short, it’s a matter of epistemic priority. Moore and Sartre say we have to start philosophy with what we know, which includes things like “there is a hand in front of me.” The task becomes figuring how what this claim really means and how knowledge must work such that we can and do know it, and by extension how we might in some circumstances be wrong about this sort of claim (such as when on drugs or dreaming) but yet we are in general, correct about this. To the skeptic, starting at this point utterly begs the question, but for Sartre, at least, to even ask the skeptical question requires abstracting from the concrete situation of knowledge as something like self-evident presentedness to imagine some greater kind of knowledge which, it turns out, we just don’t have.
The interview is frustratingly short, of course, but very thought provoking. In the wake of our Sartre recording, I’d suggested to my fellows that we do a little epistemological review episode with some Berkeley on idealism and then Kant’s and Moore’s attempts to refute it. If you second this suggestion (or contrarily think it would be boring), speak up!
Note that Elucidations has now added a blog giving some additional episode description and follow-up (though not on the Cassam interview).
-Mark Linsenmayer
Topic for #48: Merleau-Ponty on the Role of Perception in Knowledge
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in General Announcements, Things to Watch on November 23, 2011
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s magnum opus–his equivalent to Being & Nothinginess or Being & Time–is The Phenomenology of Perception. It is reputed (by Seth, at least) to complete Heidegger’s project by paying proper attention to our embodiedness: we have bodies, with specific perceptual limitations and are not only culturally but physically situated in ways that (as Heidegger insisted) make Cartesian doubt a sham. Scientism is a mistake, and in particular attempts to explain consciousness without allowing first person reports (i.e. by strictly applying the scientific method) will be hopeless, because all inquiry starts with, is founded on, and presupposes this situation of us already in the world, with other people, with all these layers of meaning packing up our conscious experiences and even our unthinking behavior, to be elaborated by phenomenology.
So the Phenomenology of Perception is a very fat book that purports to give an existential phenomenology, from an analysis of perception (attention, judgment, “the phenomenal field”), to the various aspects of having a body (its spatiality, sexuality, expression, and how mechanistic psychology and classical psychology teat it), to a consequent analysis of time and freedom. …All stated with much less of the horrific made-up terminology of Heidegger or B&T-era Satre than you’d expect.
However, that book is much too long, and takes a long time to get around to saying much, so instead, we chose to read a sort of presentation of that work to a lay audience.World of Perception,from 1948, is actually a series of radio lectures for a general audience, presenting on broad strokes what the viewpoint of the kind of philosophy he represents has to add the popular view of science.
Metaphors of Deception in “The Matrix” (incl. Plato’s Cave)
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Things to Watch on July 18, 2011
Back in our Descartes episode, we brought up the movie The Matrix as an example of the kind of situation whose possibility motivates Descartes’s project of doubt. Here’s a video getting into some of the other ways of interpreting this metaphor about deception:
Watch on YouTube.
One type mentioned here is Marxist “false consciousness” (which we got into a little in our recent Hegel discussion), with a clip from Cornel West about blind submission to authority.
Our concern here is Plato’s allegory of the cave, which we referred to in the recent Plato’s Republic episode (and also in our previous Plato on knowledge episode) without ever really laying out the story with the clarity it deserves. Starting around 3:45min into this clip, John Patridge tells the story, though generically, indicating that truth is hidden from us, and we could potentially break out of our deception and be enlightened. Without filling in the account to indicate what Plato thinks the truth is, this of course could mean anything: we could discover that all is God, or be imbued with the light of Reason, or confront the Absurd, or any number of other things. It should be clear, then, how Plato’s imagery could be coopted by Christianity or any kind of mysticism, despite the fact that Plato’s rationalism appears exactly opposed to the kind of mysticism that eschews analysis.
-Mark Linsenmayer
Russell’s Epistemology: “The Problems of Philosophy”
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in PEL's Notes on June 8, 2011
I wanted to follow up on a reference I made on the episode for folks who want to know more about Russell’s epistemology:
His book The Problems of Philosophyis an easy-reader intro to his take on traditional epistemological problems. Some of it will be familiar if you’ve listened to our episodes (from p. 42). For instance, he claims: “The faculty of being acquainted with things other than itself is the main characteristic of a mind,” and uses this as an a priori refutation of idealism: the idealist confuses ideas and the objects (which we may know virtually nothing about) to which the ideas correspond.
One element of his epistemology which will sound familiar to fans of British empiricists is his distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance (from chapter 5):
Read the rest of this entry »
Episode 31: Husserl’s Phenomenology
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on January 10, 2011
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:49:58 — 100.7MB)
Discussing Edmund Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (1931).
How can we analyze our experience? Husserl thinks that Descartes was right about the need to ground science from the standpoint of our own experience, but wrong about everything else. Husserl recommends we “bracket” the question of whether the external world exists and just focus on the contents of our consciousness (the “cogito”). He thinks that with good, theory-free observations (meaning very difficult, unnatural language), we can give an account of the essential structures of experience, which will include truth, certainty, and objectivity (intersubjective verifiability): all that science needs. We’ll find that we don’t need to ground the existence of objects in space and other minds, because our entire experience presupposes them; they’re already indubitable.
Plus “Personal Philosophies” for Seth and Wes!
Read the text online or purchase it.
End song: “Sleep,” from the Mark Linsenmayer album Spanish Armada, Songs of Love and Related Neuroses (1993).
Episode 30: Schopenhauer on Explanations and Knowledge
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on December 19, 2010
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 2:13:39 — 122.4MB)
Discussing Arthur Schopenhauer’s On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, published in 1847 (as an expansion of his doctoral thesis from 1813).
What kinds of explanations are legitimate? S. thought that causal and logical explanations are often confused, resulting in philosophical errors. In laying out the four types of explanation — the four versions of the principle of sufficient reason — he clearly elaborates his modernized Kantian epistemology. We also discuss his strange notion of “will” that was so influential on Nietzsche and Freud. Plus, we discuss “Action Philosophers!”and “Walking Dead.”
Read the book online here or purchase it.We also read this chunk of The World As Will and Representation.
End song: “The Answer,” from the forthcoming album Impossible Things by New People.
Boghossian vs. Goodman on Fact Constructivism
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Misc. Philosophical Musings, Reviewage on November 15, 2010
One book we’d mentioned on the episode as a counter to Goodman’s epistemology was Paul Boghossian’s Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism.
Boghossian’s target is any theory of knowledge that says that facts are constructed, reflecting the contingent needs and interest of some society, and that consequently some different society with different needs could construct facts so as to make any given statement that is true according to our current conception false according to the opposite conception.
I think saying only that you should be able to see that this doesn’t capture Goodman’s view: Yes, facts are constructed according to Goodman, meaning that they’re only true relative to a world wherein we build the components for such facts by positing some ontology and standards for judging a statement about that ontology true, and yes, the choice of ontology is not dictated to us by evidence, but neither is it true for Goodman that anything goes, that you could construct a world such that any given statement “true for us” given our conceptual scheme would be false under some other scheme.
Topic for #30: Schopenhauer’s Twist on Kant’s Epistemology
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in General Announcements on November 8, 2010
Schopenhauer is widely known for being influenced by Buddhism’s claim that life is suffering and for in turn influencing Nietzsche, but his major influence is Kant.
On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, was originally written (in 1813) as S’s dissertation but was later expanded and clarified for proper publication (in 1847). He considered this his core work which you need to read to understand any of the rest of it. Whereas most of the other post-Kantians of note (like Hegel, Nietzsche, and Sartre) ignore or deny the existence of Kant’s “thing-in-itself,” i.e. the objective thing prior to our cognizing it, Schopenhauer makes it the core of his philosophy, connecting it with the “will to live.” So that would be the “will” part in his more famous book The World as Will and Representation, which is very large and will have to wait for a future episode for us to look into. The essay we will be reading covers more of the “representation” part of this, with the principle of sufficient reason being the way in which we understand things: we look for their cause, for the reason why the thing is there and is the way it is. Schopenhauer reorganizes Kant’s analysis of our faculties of knowledge by elaborating four classes of explanation that fall under this principle of sufficient reason, which you can preview here if you’d like.
You can read the book online here or purchase it.
Catherine Elgin on the Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Web Detritus on November 5, 2010
One of the chapters that I referred to from Nelson Goodman’s final book, Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences,was “The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity.”
I’ve found that article online (I can’t swear it’s exactly the same as the version in Reconceptions, but it seems to have all the elements intact) here. It critiques both the correspondence and coherence theories of truth, saying that neither recognizes the superiority in understanding that a smart person will have over a dumb person in any given situation: Dumb people will find it easier to have “justified, true belief” because they will believe less critically and ask questions that require less justification and are easier to answer/confirm. Likewise, it will be easier for a dumb person to bring new information into coherence with existing beliefs, because he has fewer and simpler existing beliefs and just doesn’t see subtleties that would create problems for more discerning seekers of knowledge. The solution, then, is to shoot for “understanding” which does admit of depth and complexity, as opposed to simply “knowledge,” which is presented here as a species of understanding along with the understanding of works of art, which is not typically considered “knowledge” at all yet which Goodman wants acknowledge as important too.
It turns out that, like the introductory chapter of that book that omits Goodman’s talk of “worlds” in favor of “schemes” this essay was primarily written by Goodman’s co-author, Catherine Z. Elgin. Now, I don’t know what the story was re. their writing Reconceptions together; she also wrote at least one other article with him and a couple of books about his work. Reconceptions was published when Goodman was about 84 years old, and while I’m sure that some of the articles were written earlier, I imagine at that point he wasn’t averse to the idea of having someone else do the hard work of coming up with new and persuasive formulations of his overall epistemological project while he took the chief role in writing in some specific areas of art (e.g. architecture occupies a big chunk of the book) that he hadn’t fully explored.
-Mark Linsenmayer
Episode 28: Nelson Goodman on Art as Epistemology
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on October 31, 2010
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 2:10:17 — 122.7MB)
Discussing Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking (1978).
What’s the relationship between art and science? Does understanding works of art constitute “knowledge,” and if so, how does this relate to other kinds of knowledge? Goodman describes art as a symbol system (including art like instrumental music that doesn’t seem representative), which can symbolize successfully or not. While there is no one set of concepts by which to judge all art (different types of art and other descriptive endeavors establish incommensurable “worlds”), neither is art an anything goes endeavor where the individual spectator is the only determinant of quality.
We’re joined by painter Jay Bailey to bring up lots of amusing artwork examples (The Monkees! Thomas Kinkade! Self-mutilation as art!) and tell us how well Goodman’s account accords with his understanding of artistic practice (his answer: not so well).
Read the text online or buy it.
End song: “Staple Gun” by Mark Lint and Stevie P (1999).
Episode 22: More James’s Pragmatism: Is Faith Justified? What is Truth?
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on July 18, 2010
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:38:26 — 90.2MB)
Discussing William James’s “The Will to Believe” and continuing our discussion from Episode 20 on James’s conception of truth as described in his books Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth, again featuring guest podcaster Dylan Casey.
Does pragmatism give ground for religious belief, like if I say it feels good for me to believe in God, is that in any sense a legitimate grounds for that belief? Is belief in science or rationality itself a form of faith? Is religious belief a “forced choice,” or does it just not matter what you believe?
Also, we sort further through James on truth: truth is created by us, but what does that mean? That only statements actually verified or otherwise useful are true, or can have a truth value (true of false) at all? In saying that we create truth, does that make James a relativist, and if so, is that bad?
Read “The Will to Believe,” Pragmatism, and The Meaning of Truth (the most useful chapters for our purposes are 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, and 15).
End song: “Who Cares What You Believe?” by Madison Lint (2001).
Episode 20: Pragmatism – Peirce and James
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on June 9, 2010
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 2:07:51 — 234.2MB)
Reading Pragmatism by William James and “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” by Charles Sanders Peirce.
Is truth a primitive relation between our representations and things objectively in the world, or is it an analyzable process by which propositions “prove their worth” by being useful in some way, like by fitting well with other portions of our experience or being delicious?
Peirce, the inventor of pragmatism, focuses on the philosophy of science and thinks of inquiry as a way for us to just settle on any belief we can stomach. James, who popularized pragmatism, has a wider view that applies not only to science but to religious beliefs. If it makes you feel nice to believe in Hogwarts, should you do so?
The episode features guest podcaster Dylan Casey (previously from our quantum physics episode).
Read Pragmatism online or purchase it.
End Song: “Friend” from 1998’s Mark Lint and the Fake Johnson Trio; the whole album is now free online.
Episode 18: Plato: What Is Knowledge?
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on April 20, 2010
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 2:17:56 — 126.3MB)
Discussing the Theaetetus and the Meno, two dialogues about knowledge.
We’re returning to Plato for a somewhat more thorough treatment than we gave him in Episode 1. This should be considered part two (Hume being #1) of three discussions intended to convey the main conflict in the history of epistemology between the empiricists (like Hume) and the rationalists (like Plato).
We slog through most of the Theaetetus, where Plato considers and rejects a series of mostly very lame conceptions of knowledge and replaces them at the end with… NOTHING. Seth is crushed. In the Meno, knowledge is “remembrance” (maybe), like anything worth knowing can’t be learned but only elicited out of the depths of your unconscious.
Read along: The Theaetetus and The Meno, or if you don’t like the funky background on those pages, look them up via Project Gutenberg. You could also purchase
Seth did this diagram to express his love of the Meno.
End song: “Obvious Boy” by Mark Lint and the Fake from the album So Whaddaya Think? (2000). Listen to the whole album online.
Episode 17: Hume’s Empiricism: What Can We Know?
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on March 29, 2010
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 2:05:25 — 114.9MB)
Reading David Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
David Hume thinks that all we can know are our own impressions, i.e. what our moment-to-moment experiences tell us. Funny thing, though: he thinks that no experience shows us one event causing another event. We only experience one thing happening, then another, and these sequences tend to display a lot of uniformity. So, if we have any legitimate idea of causality at all, it must just be that: regular patterns of conjoined events.
We discuss what Hume thinks this view implies for the free will question, belief in miracles, whether external objects are actually there, Seth’s experience of Towlie, and more.
Read with us: http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/9662.
End song: “Twitch” by by The MayTricks, from the 1994 album Happy Songs Will Bring You Down.






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