Posts Tagged Ethics
Episode 50: Pirsig’s “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance”
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on February 3, 2012
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:26:18 — 79.1MB)
On Robert M. Pirsig’s philosophical, autobiographical novel from 1974.
What’s the relationship between science and values? Pirsig thinks that modern rationality, by insisting on the fundamental distinction between objects (matter) and subjects (people), labels value judgments as irrational. Society therefore largely ignores aesthetic considerations in the buildings and machines that litter our landscape.
People rebel against this ugly commercialism by rejecting technology altogether, and Pirsig thinks this is a mistake. If we realize that value judgments (where we sense “Quality”) are fundamentally a part of experience, that they drive what what we consider “rational” (e.g. a “good” scientific explanation) in the first place, then we can stop with the hippie rebellion and more sensibly and peacefully co-exist with technology. Though the book is not about historical Zen, it is about keeping centered, connected, and in the moment.
Featuring guest participant David Buchanan. Read more about the topic and get the book.
End song: “Freeway” by Mark Lint and Stevie P. Read about it.
If you enjoy the episode, please donate at least $1:
Topic for #50: Robert Pirsig’s “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance”
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in General Announcements on January 6, 2012
[Note: This article has been updated post-discussion; I didn't want to create a new post when we've had all this great discussion on this one that I want people to continue. The episode itself should be up w/in the next day or two.]
Mark, Seth, Dylan, and guest David Buchanan have recorded a conversation on Robert M. Pirsig’sZen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,a book that’s not about Zen and only a little bit about motorcycle maintenance.
It’s an autobiographical novel describing (in part) Pirsig’s encounters with the idea of “Quality.” In trying to teach this to freshman composition students, he decided that it’s a fundamental, immediate, and undefinable part of our experience. We don’t, on his account, first consciously analyze things, and then decide based on that analysis what’s better than what. Quality (or more precisely, “dynamic quality,” a term he comes up with in his 1991 book Lila: An Inquiry Into Morals)phenomenologically primary: even distinguishing a foreground object from the background, i.e. perception itself, relies on a quality judgment, namely that this aspect of the perceptual field is of interest. Once we establish habits like this (e.g. object recognition, which can be generalized into a metaphysics of objects in space), they get ossified, codified, and passed on, so they seem natural, but we can’t forget that all the systems of classification, of conceptualization, of making sense of things at all are human inventions. This should sound very much like William James’s pragmatism.
Amartya Sen on Hume on Ethics
Posted by Daniel Horne in Things to Watch on November 12, 2011
This video records Nobel laureate Amartya Sen’s somewhat rambling lecture, wherein he discusses a few themes in Hume’s ethical work which he deems relevant today. Specifically, Sen wants to advocate for Hume’s argument that society’s globalization tends to expand its moral sensitivities. We hear that Hume was among the first to argue that a society’s mores were a function of its culture rather than physical circumstances. Hume was also an early critic of then-nascent British imperialism, arguing that it demeaned the conquerers as much as the conquered.
Many of the Humean insights to which Sen refers seem so obviously true today as to be unworthy of further discussion. But perhaps that says as much of Hume’s foresight and intellectual victory as the tepid nature of Sen’s summary. To be honest, I couldn’t tease out any great insights from the lecture, but I’ll let Sen’s intellectual cred justify the post, and anyway it may prove interesting to those trying to assess Hume’s contributions, if not his continued relevance.
-Daniel Horne
Kelly Oliver (via The Stone/NY Times) on Pet Lovers
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Misc. Philosophical Musings, Web Detritus on October 31, 2011
Though we’ve not had a link to an article in The Stone for a while, I encourage you all to keep a look out there, as it’s a steady source of interesting articles.
I can’t resist throwing up a link to this article by Kelly Oliver: “Pet Lovers, Pathologized,” as it hooks into both our moral sense and feminism episodes.
Our inconsistent treatment of animals is one of the key signs that something is wrong with our cultural values. I’ve got a new puppy in the house now, and like any responsible pet owner, I acknowledge a real moral responsibility toward her. It’s very much like having a toddler in the house, and if I really just considered her property or a toy or something, I wouldn’t put up with any of it. But the issue is not just our hypocritical “I love my pets, but they have no moral standing” stance. As Ms. Oliver points out:
The animal rights and animal welfare debates continue to be dominated by discussions of whether and how animals have minds or intentions like we do. This discourse continues to measure animals against human standards in order to judge whether or not they deserve legal rights.
Topic for #42: Feminists on Human Nature and Moral Psychology
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in General Announcements on July 25, 2011
This episode will feature Azzurra Crispino, whom you might recall from our Kant on epistemology episode. We’re reading two works that were significant for the development of her interest in feminist philosophy:
Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s Herland
Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice
Churchland Ep. Name Drop #1: W.D. Ross
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in PEL's Notes, Web Detritus on July 21, 2011
Our Churchland episode was exceptional in that we suspended some of our regular rules, including, I think, the one on name dropping, so I want to fill in some of the gaps through this blog by giving you readers an idea who some of these people are.
I brought up W.D. Ross in the context of trying to fill out Churchland’s actual ethical views. Churchland concentrates in her book on the back-end story: what’s going on in the brain, and what went on in evolution, to produce our moral sense? She was much more forthcoming in our conversation with her about how to resolve actual issues (e.g. re. the drug war), and even that discussion was more of a sketch re. how ethical deliberation might run (i.e. consider all the complicated factors involved, including the history and “facts on the ground”) rather than a fully fleshed out example.
I posited that Ross might provide a model for actual ethical decision-making under her general, Humean framework. At the same time, Ross has key elements in common with some of Hume’s opponents among his contemporaries who said that relations between ethical terms such as “beneficence” and “gratitude” are given by reason itself (I believe that example is from John Balguy).
Michael Sandel on Kant’s Morality (Like Plato?)
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in PEL's Notes, Things to Watch on July 15, 2011
In response to my Steven B. Smith post, Facebook commenter Robinson K. recommended Michael Sandel of Harvard as another great lecturer in political philosophy.
He’s got a whole course on “Justice” available for online viewing. Though there doesn’t appear to be a lecture on Plato in there, I noted that episode 7 was described by reference to the example Plato uses (referred to on the Plato episode, and more extensively on our Kant morality episode) about whether you lie to someone to prevent an act of brutality (the “Nazis at the door looking for the hidden Jews” example). Here’s that lecture in full:
Watch at JusticeHarvard.org.
Get the video podcast from iTunes.
Now, for the most part, this is just a rather labored (i.e. aimed at undergraduates unfamiliar with Kant’s difficult-to-understand views) presentation of Kant on morality, but I took a look at this with Plato in mind and found a parallel:
At around 6 minutes in, he describes Kant’s view of morality as arising out of our status as non-empirical beings:
“As a subject of experience, I inhabit an intelligible world… to be independent of causes in the sensible world is to be free.”
Episode 40: Plato’s Republic: What Is Justice?
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on July 11, 2011
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:36:59 — 88.9MB)
Discussing The Republic by Plato, primarily books 1 and 2.
What is justice? What is the ideal type of government? In the dialogue, Socrates argues that justice is real (not just a fiction the strong make up) and that it’s not relative to who you are (in the sense that it would always be just to help your friends and hurt your enemies). Justice ends up being a matter of balancing your soul so the rational part is in control over the rest of you.
The Republic is Plato’s utopia, described by analogy with justice in the individual: In the ideal state, the rational people will be in charge, and these leaders should go through rigorous conditioning and live communally (spouse sharing!) in order for them to serve the state effectively.
You’ll hear Wes and Dylan Casey talk about their St. John’s experiences (the “Johnny” discussion-only format provides a chief model for P.E.L.’s). Plus, Gay Girl from Damascus, which music degrades your character, and does suffering make people morally worse?
End song: “Manager,” from the 2011 New People album, Impossible Things (song written in 1997).
Topic for #40: Plato’s Republic
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in General Announcements on June 5, 2011
What is justice? What is the ideal type of government? These are the two questions we’ll be focusing on in our discussion of the most famous book of philosophy ever.
Look, we realize that if you’ve ever taken a philosophy class, you’ve likely already been introduced to this work, and there are many many other places on the Web to find out about it, including some great university lectures and podcasts. By all means, feel free to make use of some of these resources; listen to the book itself, if you’d like.
We’ll do our best to add to the pool, with not one but two guest participants personally trained by Plato himself. We’ll be focusing our discussion primarily on books 1, 2, and 4, but will delve into other portions of the work as needed in pursuit of an adequate definition of justice and details about Plato’s very weird ideal city wherein philosophers rule, everyone stays in his or her little proper career path for life, wives and children are shared in common, and musicians shall not play those damned plaintive minor chords! None of that!
Purchase the translation of the text to be read by 2 out of the 4 participants in the discussion
Does Atheism Entail Nihilism? (Or, is God Necessary for Morality?)
Posted by Wes Alwan in Things to Watch, Web Detritus on May 10, 2011
An interesting debate. And it continues on Prosblogion.
Update: Now that I’ve listened to the whole thing, I have to say Craig is in over his head and Kagan makes minced meat of him. I wish they had been more evenly matched.
Update II: Here’s an interesting article by Wes Morriston (who linked to it in the Prosblogion comments) rebutting Craig: God and the ontological foundations of morality. And then there are the Stanford entries on moral arguments for the existence of god, moral realism, and moral naturalism.
Apparently God is as bad at grounding morality as Science.
– Wes
Science Cannot Ground Morality. But Robots Can
Posted by Wes Alwan in Web Detritus on December 14, 2010
Via Massimo Pigliucci, this gives us a nice overview of the fundamental objection to Sam Harris’ notion that moral questions can be decided by the empirical sciences.
Wes Alwan
Simon Blackburn vs Sam Harris: Can Science Tell us Right from Wrong?
Posted by Wes Alwan in Things to Watch on December 9, 2010
In a debate with Patricia Churchland, Peter Singer, Sam Harris, and Lawrence Krauss, Simon Blackburn explains why Harris simply has it wrong on whether science can provide substantive guidance on morality:
There is no doubt, he notes, that “science can inform our values” (and I would add that this goes trivially for many other types of knowledge). But “as to whether you need nothing but science”, “I don’t agree with Sam about that and neither do the other three speakers we’ve heard so far.”
Episode 29: Kierkegaard on the Self
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on November 21, 2010
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:56:32 — 106.8MB)
Discussing Soren Kierkegaard’s “The Sickness Unto Death” (1849).
What is the self? For K. we are a tension between opposites: necessity and possibility, the finite and the infinite, soul and body. He thinks we’re all in despair, whether we know it or not, because we wrongly think we’re something we’re not, or we reject what we are, or we just don’t pay attention to this dynamic at all: we just go along with the crowd. So we need to keep self-examining and (he thinks) ultimately embrace our subservience to God.
Joined by guest podcaster/Kiekegaard’s lawyer Daniel Horne, we consider K.’s 3-step self-help program and whether there’s anything to be gotten here if you don’t subscribe to K’s Christianity.
Read the text free online or buy the book.We also devote some discussion to Fear and Trembling.
End song: “John T. Flibber,” from Happy Songs Will Bring You Down by the MayTricks (1994).
WEIRD vs. World ethics
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Web Detritus on October 24, 2010
Psychologist Jonathan Haidt writes an interesting review of The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happenby Kwame Anthony Appiah: read the review here.
In evaluating our moral intuitions, we often reflect on whether this kind of phenomenology has resonance beyond other Western (“Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD)”) points of view. Appiah’s book focuses on honor killings and other “honor” practices, which seem only removable when the society in question gets mocked enough for engaging in them that they are dishonored, i.e. honor itself is used to halt the practice that was only kept in place to keep honor. Appiah argues, though, that since WEIRD societies focus on individual ethics and don’t see a moral wrong by an individual as a stain against the group, that removes a prime mechanism for moral improvement at the social level.
Stated this way (and of course I’m sure there’s more to it in Appiah’s book), I don’t quite get it. If we don’t currently have horrific practices perpetuated in the name of honor in the West, then we don’t need this mechanism to remove them. It would be nice if we had social mechanisms to encourage progress on (or dismissal of concerns regarding) alleged socially approved misdeeds like abortion, eating meat, and circumcision (none of which seem directly tied to honor), but the fact that we have a vigorous democracy with lots of parties speaking seems to give more hope of long-term resolution re. these issues (in the way that recent progress has been made re. gay rights and how concerns about interracial marriage have for the most part disappeared) than alternative social arrangements.
(Note: the image here is by Vlad Gerasimov.)
-Mark Linsenmayer
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