Posts Tagged logic
From Technologist to Humanist: Google’s “In-House” Philosopher
Posted by Tom McDonald in Web Detritus on July 24, 2011
I had been thinking about the PEL debate on the value of higher education, and came across this compelling story by Damon Horowitz.
Did you know that Google has an “in-house philosopher”? Horowitz shares his personal story of self-transformation in this article for the Chronicle of Higher Education. With a background in software engineering, he had developed a career in the world of information technology. He had established his own business engineering “natural language processing” components for Artificial Intelligence systems. (Natural language processing is the part of AI, usually based on formal logic, that is supposed to make computers understand us).
But his challenging encounters with the limitations of AI led him to broader philosophical questions about “the nature of thought, the structure of language, [and] the grounds of meaning.” Horowitz thus left the world of IT to do a PhD in Philosophy and has today become a sort of evangelist for appreciation of the humanities in the world of technology. He makes an argument for the value of leaving technology to do a degree in the humanities (it is an article in the Chronicle of Higher Ed after all), but even if you are not sold on that idea, his point extends to a larger argument about importance of bringing a humanities perspective to the world of technology which is bad off for its lack:
From Technologist to Philosopher
http://chronicle.com/article/From-Technologist-to/128231/
- Tom McDonald
Bertrand Russell’s Very Short Introduction to His Ontology
Posted by Daniel Horne in Things to Watch on June 1, 2011
For those who can’t get enough Bertrand Russell, here’s an introduction to logical analysis from his History of Western Philosophy.
Topic for #38: Russell on Math and Logic
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in General Announcements on April 14, 2011
What is a number? Is it some Platonic entity floating outside of space and time that we somehow come into communion with? We’ll be following up our foray into analytical philosophy with Frege with some Bertrand Russell: specifically his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919), which is the much shortened, non-technical version of his famous Principia Mathematica(written with Whitehead). Frege and Russell agree that numbers and other mathematical notions are reducible to logical operations. Russell, beyond this, sees logical truths as a matter of derivation from definitions: not self-evident truths, and not all from the law of non-contradiction, but by basics that we have to discover through logical analysis, and we try to push the analysis back as far as possible, and wherever possible make mathematics into specific cases of more general principles, so, e.g. properties of sequences of numbers are seen as special cases of sequences of objects.
We’ll focus on chapters 1-3, where he recounts Frege’s derivation of the concept of number (he says these pick out sets of things in the actual world: the number 3 is identical to the set of all trios, for instance, where “trios” are defined without explicit use of the number 3 or any other number), and then chapters 13-18, where he deals with some potential problems with this definition (e.g. ch. 13 asks what happens if there are a finite number of things in the world: then some high number would end up equaling the empty set), giving a crash course in symbolic logic (in ch. 14 and 15), giving a quick account of his theory of descriptions (as discussed in our Frege and Wittgenstein episodes) reducing (in ch. 17) the notion of a class or set itself to more fundamental logical notions (i.e. propositional functions), and (in ch. 18) giving a summary account on the relation between mathematics and logic (i.e. that there’s no line to be drawn between the two).
Read along with us online (the page includes a variety of different pdfs for tablet/phone reading) or buy the book.
Yet More on Logic: Quantification
Posted by Seth Paskin in PEL's Notes on March 26, 2011
Against both my better judgment and the hue and cry of many, I will continue my semi-informed-by-past-years-of-studying “exposition” of predicate logic which I started here. If I accomplish nothing else, I will give Burl something to complain about for the next week or so.
In the previous installment, we talked about how syllogistic statements about “all x’s” assert the truth of a conditional statement. “All dogs bark” asserts that for all x’s, if x is a dog, then x barks. Formally expressed, that’s:
∀x(Dog(x) –> Barks(x))
or something similar. It doesn’t say anything about whether there actually are any dogs. Additionally, the ‘For all…’ symbol – ∀ – doesn’t allow you to say anything about only some dogs. Let us address that issue.
Logicomix!
Posted by Daniel Horne in Reviewage on March 23, 2011
In the recent Frege episode, Mark related the famous anecdote of how Bertrand Russell, the man who “discovered” Frege, later confounded him by pointing out a paradox apparent within his logical system. As Wes recounted, Russell’s own attempt to ground mathematics in logic was also later frustrated by a young Kurt Gödel, whose early incompleteness theorems crippled the central purpose of Principia Mathematica.
Anyway, those of us who suffer nausea upon seeing the character ∀ can nevertheless relive those heady days with Logicomix. A comic book about the quest for absolute logical certainty makes an unlikely choice for an award-winning New York Times bestseller, but I must say its an entertaining read. To steal a brief recap from the NYT book review:
The story spans the decades from the late 19th century to World War II, a period when the nature of mathematical truth was being furiously debated. The stellar cast, headed up by Bertrand Russell, includes the greatest philosophers, logicians and mathematicians of the era, along with sundry wives and mistresses, plus a couple of homicidal maniacs, an apocryphal barber and Adolf Hitler.
Spoiler alert, per Seth: “Founding anything always fails.”
-Daniel Horne
Logic: A Quick Remedial Lesson
Posted by Matt Teichman in PEL's Notes on March 16, 2011
Editor’s Note: Matt Teichman, our guest on the Frege episode, has been good enough to provide this primer on logic for our listeners who’ve not already had to sit through a class on it or who might need a refresher:
One of the things we said at the beginning the episode on Frege was that he is the father of modern logic. But what is logic, anyway? For those of you who never heard of logic before, here is a quick primer.
Logic is the study of what philosophers call valid reasoning. In everyday conversation, valid just means ‘good’ or ‘appropriate.’ But in logic, valid has a special technical meaning. To see what it means, let’s look at an example of an argument:
Argument 1:
All people drink water.
Matt is a person.
—————–
Therefore, Matt drinks water.
Argument is also a term we’re going to use in a special technical sense. Here, rather than referring to e.g. a dispute between me and my wife about whether to get a new car, it refers to a line of reasoning meant to convince someone of something. More specifically, we’ll think of an argument as a sequence of sentences broken down into two parts: first come the premises, then comes the conclusion. (You can also have an argument with just one premise, or even an argument with no premises! But all arguments need to have a conclusion.) In the above example, the premises are All people drink water and Matt is a person, and the conclusion is Matt drinks water.
Anyway, let’s get back to validity. An argument is valid just in case it is impossible for its premises to be true and for its conclusion to be simultaneously false. Consider the above example: if all people drink water, and Matt is a person, then there’s simply no way that Matt could fail to drink water. It’s absolutely, positively guaranteed.
Episode 34: Frege on the Logic of Language
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on March 13, 2011
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:47:51 — 98.8MB)
Discussing Gottlob Frege’s “Sense and Reference,” “Concept and Object” (both from 1892) and “The Thought” (1918).
What is it about sentences that make them true or false? Frege, the father of analytic philosophy who invented modern symbolic logic, attempted to codify language in a way that would make this obvious, which would ground mathematics and science. Applying his symbolic system to natural language forced him to invent strange entities like “thoughts” and “senses” that are neither physical nor psychological, and we pretty much spend this episode kvetching about the metaphysical implications of this and the fact that Frege didn’t care about them.
Featuring guest podcaster Matt Teichman, who also hosts Elucidations.
Read along: “The Thought,” “On Sense and Reference,” “On Concept and Object,” and we also read
Frege’s introduction (p. 12-25) to his book The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System (1904), or just buy this book.
End song: “The Great Forgotten Lover,” from the 2011 New People album, Impossible Things.
Topic for #34: Frege on Language, Truth, and Logic
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in General Announcements on February 13, 2011
What is it about sentences that expresses truth or falsity? Gottlob Frege is considered one of the fathers of analytic philosophy, but it’s hard for someone with a general interest in philosophy to see much of his work as overtly philosophical. He did a lot of the work inventing modern symbolic logic, with an eye to providing a logical foundation for mathematics. But in doing this, he showed a philosophical agenda that was very influential for Wittgenstein and many others.
Frege is concerned with what it is about sentences that make them true or false. He’s convinced that while our judgments about matters of fact are subjective, the matters of fact themselves are not. His objectivity is so extreme here that he considers abstract propositional entities, numbers, and meanings to be objectively real; they aren’t just ideas you or I have in our heads, but are discovered and shareable between different people. He thinks that while a proper name refers to something in the world (“Dick Clark”), a sentence about that name (“Dick Clark is bad ass”) correspondingly refers to THE TRUE, i.e. a weird metaphysical entity that all true sentences refer to. Smoke that, man!
Read these articles along with us:
“The Thought” (1918)
“On Sense and Reference” (1892)
“On Concept and Object” (1892)
Frege’s introduction (p. 12-25) to his book The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System (1904)






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