Posts Tagged pragmatism
Lila Notes, Pt. 2: Dynamic vs. Static Quality
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in PEL's Notes on February 5, 2012
The big distinction made in Lila is between dynamic quality and static quality. Dynamic quality is Quality in ZAMM, i.e. the immediate, moment-to-moment recognition of something’s awesomeness level, but also in ZAMM, he wants us to recognize quality in classical (as opposed to romantic) forms, for example, the quality of the structure of a motorcycle. Since dynamic quality is instantaneous, and we can only have (roughly) one thing in mind at a time, it would seem to rule out any kind of body of quality knowledge, but that’s clearly not the way judgments work.
Pirsig stresses that we make Quality judgments first, and then figure out later how to characterize them. But certainly this doesn’t have to the be case: often we have a standard already in mind, and we explicitly apply that standard to something and judge it positively or negatively. Judges are supposed to do this, for example. Now, you could say that what judges do (looking at legal precedent and seeing how a new case stacks up) is cold and impersonal: they don’t necessarily feel the verdicts they issue, and in fact might have feelings contrary to what they judge, but still, that doesn’t mean they should overturn all legal precedent on a whim.
Episode 50: Pirsig’s “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance”
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on February 3, 2012
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:26:18 — 79.1MB)
On Robert M. Pirsig’s philosophical, autobiographical novel from 1974.
What’s the relationship between science and values? Pirsig thinks that modern rationality, by insisting on the fundamental distinction between objects (matter) and subjects (people), labels value judgments as irrational. Society therefore largely ignores aesthetic considerations in the buildings and machines that litter our landscape.
People rebel against this ugly commercialism by rejecting technology altogether, and Pirsig thinks this is a mistake. If we realize that value judgments (where we sense “Quality”) are fundamentally a part of experience, that they drive what what we consider “rational” (e.g. a “good” scientific explanation) in the first place, then we can stop with the hippie rebellion and more sensibly and peacefully co-exist with technology. Though the book is not about historical Zen, it is about keeping centered, connected, and in the moment.
Featuring guest participant David Buchanan. Read more about the topic and get the book.
End song: “Freeway” by Mark Lint and Stevie P. Read about it.
If you enjoy the episode, please donate at least $1:
Topic for #50: Robert Pirsig’s “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance”
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in General Announcements on January 6, 2012
[Note: This article has been updated post-discussion; I didn't want to create a new post when we've had all this great discussion on this one that I want people to continue. The episode itself should be up w/in the next day or two.]
Mark, Seth, Dylan, and guest David Buchanan have recorded a conversation on Robert M. Pirsig’sZen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance,a book that’s not about Zen and only a little bit about motorcycle maintenance.
It’s an autobiographical novel describing (in part) Pirsig’s encounters with the idea of “Quality.” In trying to teach this to freshman composition students, he decided that it’s a fundamental, immediate, and undefinable part of our experience. We don’t, on his account, first consciously analyze things, and then decide based on that analysis what’s better than what. Quality (or more precisely, “dynamic quality,” a term he comes up with in his 1991 book Lila: An Inquiry Into Morals)phenomenologically primary: even distinguishing a foreground object from the background, i.e. perception itself, relies on a quality judgment, namely that this aspect of the perceptual field is of interest. Once we establish habits like this (e.g. object recognition, which can be generalized into a metaphysics of objects in space), they get ossified, codified, and passed on, so they seem natural, but we can’t forget that all the systems of classification, of conceptualization, of making sense of things at all are human inventions. This should sound very much like William James’s pragmatism.
Kung Fu Pragmatism
Posted by Dylan Casey in Web Detritus on December 13, 2010
Editor’s Note: You may recall our new contributor Dylan Casey from our quantum physics and pragmatism episodes. He’s a physics Ph.D. who teaches philosophy, literature, and other things at St. John’s College in Annapolis, Maryland, and I’m married to his sister. -ML
This article from “The Stone” (as in philosopher’s stone) in the NYTimes argues that, properly understood, kung fu embodies a philosophical disposition that has important features in common with both Aristotelian virtue ethics and pragmatism (i.e., James, Dewey, Rorty, etc.).
Later Pragmatists: Robert Brandom on language
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Things to Watch on July 24, 2010
OK, at this point I’m just going on youtube searches for “pragmatism;” I was not previously familiar with Brandom, though he is apparently well known and studied under Rorty and Princeton and has a beard that looks stunning when backlit.
He has some interesting comments here about the historical point at which pragmatism as we read about it arose and about “analytic pragmatism,” i.e. using analytic philosophy tools for treating language in pursuing the pragmatist project. Some of this is a little technical, but you can probably see what he’s trying to synthesize in broad strokes. And did you know that Wittgenstein was really an avatar, and not really a blue-skinned alien? Brandom says so!
Here’s part II, where he goes into the relation between philosophy of language and cognitive science, which will give you a clue about how weird philosophy of language is, which will be confirmed when we do our Frege and Heidegger episodes (eventually). Read the rest of this entry »
Later Pragmatists: Rorty on truth
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Things to Watch on July 22, 2010
Maybe the most famous current pragmatist is Richard Rorty. He doesn’t like William James’s redefinition of the word “truth,” but he thinks that virtually everything James said about it could be better applied to the word “justification.” Plus, you get to see subtitles in (I think) Dutch!
Later Pragmatists: Quine on mind
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Things to Watch on July 20, 2010
In our discussions on William James, we alluded to later pragmatists and the relationship of pragmatism to verificationism (logical positivism). Does being a pragmatist, who tries to reduce philosophical problems to problems of how we should most intelligently act in the face of world, mean that you have to discount claims that can’t be verified by empirical science?
Here’s W.V.O. Quine (who is typically considered a pragmatist) being interviewed about our philosophy of mind topic, where he comes down as reductive materialist with sympathies to behaviorism:
Note his diagnosis of the problem of free will as being a result of philosophical confusion. Read the rest of this entry »
Episode 22: More James’s Pragmatism: Is Faith Justified? What is Truth?
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on July 18, 2010
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 1:38:26 — 90.2MB)
Discussing William James’s “The Will to Believe” and continuing our discussion from Episode 20 on James’s conception of truth as described in his books Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth, again featuring guest podcaster Dylan Casey.
Does pragmatism give ground for religious belief, like if I say it feels good for me to believe in God, is that in any sense a legitimate grounds for that belief? Is belief in science or rationality itself a form of faith? Is religious belief a “forced choice,” or does it just not matter what you believe?
Also, we sort further through James on truth: truth is created by us, but what does that mean? That only statements actually verified or otherwise useful are true, or can have a truth value (true of false) at all? In saying that we create truth, does that make James a relativist, and if so, is that bad?
Read “The Will to Believe,” Pragmatism, and The Meaning of Truth (the most useful chapters for our purposes are 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, and 15).
End song: “Who Cares What You Believe?” by Madison Lint (2001).
Episode 20: Pragmatism – Peirce and James
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Podcast Episodes on June 9, 2010
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 2:07:51 — 234.2MB)
Reading Pragmatism by William James and “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” by Charles Sanders Peirce.
Is truth a primitive relation between our representations and things objectively in the world, or is it an analyzable process by which propositions “prove their worth” by being useful in some way, like by fitting well with other portions of our experience or being delicious?
Peirce, the inventor of pragmatism, focuses on the philosophy of science and thinks of inquiry as a way for us to just settle on any belief we can stomach. James, who popularized pragmatism, has a wider view that applies not only to science but to religious beliefs. If it makes you feel nice to believe in Hogwarts, should you do so?
The episode features guest podcaster Dylan Casey (previously from our quantum physics episode).
Read Pragmatism online or purchase it.
End Song: “Friend” from 1998’s Mark Lint and the Fake Johnson Trio; the whole album is now free online.
David Chalmers on “Merely Verbal” Disputes
Posted by Mark Linsenmayer in Other (i.e. Lesser) Podcasts on May 25, 2010
Here’s a talk by philosopher David Chalmers presenting a general framework to determine whether a dispute is “merely verbal.” This process also helps to unearth core disagreements and concepts, e.g. commitments by one party to the existence of normativity, consciousness, truth, or other fundamentals that the other side may wish to simply deny.
I found this helpful both for the pragmatism discussion (he even talks about William James a bit here) that I’m currently editing and on the philosophy of mind discussion (Chalmers is a significant voice in that area) that we’ll be having next.






Recent Comments